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Abstract 
 
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of organizational ethical 
culture on the ethical decisions of tax practitioners in mainland China. 
 
Design/methodology/approach – The study is based on a field survey of practicing 
public accountants. 
 
Findings – As hypothesized, certain dimensions of ethical culture had highly significant 
effects on intentions to engage in aggressive tax minimization strategies. Cultures 
characterized by strong ethical norms and incentives for ethical behavior significantly 
reduced the reported likelihood of engaging in unethical behavior in a high moral 
intensity case. In a low moral intensity case, intentions to engage in questionable 
behavior were significantly higher when participants felt that top managers in their firm 
were unethical and rewarded unethical behavior. Relativism judgments (judgments of 
what is traditionally or culturally acceptable or acceptable to one's family) emerged as 
the strongest determinant of behavioral intentions across both cases. Participants also 
appeared highly sensitive to questions regarding what is traditionally or culturally 
acceptable in Chinese tax practice. 
 
Originality/value – This is the first study of ethical decision making among tax 
practitioners in mainland China, and the findings add to a growing body of literature 
documenting the significant effects of organizational ethical context on public 
accountants' decision making processes. This has important implications for CPA firms, 
suggesting that proactive steps should be taken to promote supportive ethical contexts. 
The findings for the effects of relativism judgments raise concerns regarding the ethical 
decisions of Chinese tax practitioners, implying they are likely to engage in unethical 
behavior if they feel such behavior is common in their cultural environment. 
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Introduction 
 
Models of ethical decision making in organizations typically assume that decisions are 
affected by a variety of individual, organizational, and societal influences. For instance, 
Hunt and Vitell's (1986, 1991) widely-cited model posits that ethical decisions may be 
influenced by personal characteristics (e.g. values, beliefs, cognitive moral development); 
organizational, industry, and professional environments; and the cultural environment 
(e.g. religion, legal and political systems). Accounting researchers have conducted many 
studies of the effects of personal characteristics such as cognitive moral development 
(e.g. Bernardi and Arnold, 2004, 1997; Sweeney and Roberts, 1997; Windsor and 
Ashkanasy, 1995; Ponemon, 1992a, 1992b) and ethical orientation (e.g. Shaub et al., 
1993) on decision processes. However, relatively little attention has been paid to the 
effects of organizational influences such as the perceived ethical culture or climate[1]. 
 
The study of organizational influences on ethical decision making arguably has more 
practical significance than the study of individual characteristics, since the latter are less 
subject to influence by the organization. In contrast, it is commonly recognized that the 
ethical climate or culture in organizations may be effectively managed (Schminke et al., 
2007; Grojean et al., 2004; Treviño et al., 1999). Thus, taking proactive steps to establish 
and maintain a supportive organizational ethical culture should encourage more ethical 
decisions by employees. 
 
The relative dearth of studies on the influence of ethical context in public accounting 
firms is somewhat difficult to understand. In addition to wide recognition in theoretical 
models of ethical decision making, the importance of a supportive ethical context is 
frequently recognized in accounting practitioner journals (e.g. Gebler, 2006; Castellano 
and Lightle, 2005; Waring, 2004). Despite wide acknowledgement of its importance, 
Shafer (2008) appears to be the first study in the accounting literature to examine the 
effects of a multidimensional measure of ethical context in a public accounting setting. 
That study assessed the effects of ethical climate (Victor and Cullen, 1988, 1987) and 
firm type (local v. international) on the decisions of auditors in Mainland China. The 
study found that certain aspects of the climate in one's organization significantly 
influenced intentions to engage in questionable actions, and that auditors employed by 
international CPA firms in China made more ethical decisions than those employed by 
local Chinese CPA firms. 
 
Shafer's (2008) findings provide an initial indication that organizational ethical context 
influences decision making in Chinese public accounting firms. However, much more 
research is needed to obtain a thorough understanding of the role of ethical context in 
public accountants' decision making processes. In addition to replications and 
extensions in the auditing context, the impact of ethical context on other public 
accounting professionals such as tax practitioners should also be examined. The ethical 
issues facing tax practitioners are quite distinct from those facing auditors; for instance, 
it is widely acknowledged that tax practitioners have a responsibility to serve as 
advocates for their clients, whereas auditors must meet strict client independence rules 
(AICPA, 2009). Clearly, the determinants of ethical decisions should not be assumed to 
be equivalent across such disparate contexts. 
 
Thus, the primary objective of the current study was to extend research on the effects of 
organizational ethical climate/culture to the context of tax practitioners in Mainland 
China. Using Treviño et al.'s (1998) measure, we examine the impact of organizational 
ethical culture on several measures of ethical judgments and behavioral intentions. We 
also investigate the effects of CPA firm type (local v. international) in the distinct context 
of tax practice. 
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Literature review and hypothesis development 
 
Ethical culture 
 
Concepts such as organizational ethical culture (Treviño et al., 1998; Treviño, 1990) and 
ethical climate (Victor and Cullen, 1988, 1987) have been influential in the management 
and business ethics literature over the last two decades. These concepts derive from the 
general constructs of organizational culture or climate (e.g. Smircich, 1983; Schneider, 
1975), and may be viewed as subsets of these broader constructs (Victor and Cullen, 
1988, 1987). As mentioned previously, the impact of the organizational environment on 
decision processes draws support from theoretical models of ethical decision making in 
organizations, most of which explicitly acknowledge the importance of organizational 
influences (e.g. Hunt and Vitell, 1991, 1986; Treviño, 1986; Ferrell and Gresham, 1985). 
The collective results of many empirical studies also strongly suggest that employees' 
perceptions of the ethical context in their organization influence the likelihood of 
dysfunctional or unethical behavior as well as affective outcomes such as organizational 
commitment and job satisfaction[2]. 
 
Treviño (1990, p. 195) conceptualizes ethical culture as “[…] a complex interplay of 
formal and informal systems that can support either ethical or unethical organizational 
behavior.” Formal ethical systems embrace factors such as organizational policies, 
authority structures, and reward systems, while informal systems include factors such as 
peer behavior and perceived organizational norms and expectations. Citing Kopelman et 
al. (1990), Treviño et al. (1998, p. 451) make the distinction between two basic 
approaches to the study of ethical context in organizations: the phenomenal, which 
focuses on “observable behaviors and artifacts”, and the ideational, in which the 
emphasis is on “underlying shared meanings, symbols, and values”. Treviño's (1990) 
conceptualization of ethical culture “emphasizes the phenomenal level of culture – the 
more conscious, overt, and observable manifestations of culture such as structures, 
systems, and organizational practices, rather than the deeper structure of values and 
assumptions” (Treviño et al., 1998, p. 451). 
 
This emphasis is evident when one reviews the items included in the ethical culture 
questionnaire developed by Treviño et al. (1998) (see Appendix). The items address 
issues such as the role of top management as models of ethical behavior, organizational 
rewards for ethical behavior, discipline or punishment for unethical behavior, and 
expectations of obedience to authority. Although there are some similarities, the ethical 
culture construct is clearly distinct from the Victor and Cullen (1988, 1987) conception 
of ethical climate. Using Kopelman et al.'s (1990) terminology, the ethical climate 
construct is more “ideational” or conceptual in nature, comprising nine climate types 
derived from the crossing of two theoretical dimensions: the ethical philosophy that 
guides decision making (egoism, benevolence, principle) and the locus of analysis 
(individual, local, cosmopolitan). The ethical climate questionnaire measures employee 
perceptions of the influence of these theoretical climate types in their organization, such 
as the extent to which employees are motivated by self-interest (egoistic/individual), 
serving the public interest (benevolent/cosmopolitan), or legal/professional principles 
(principle/cosmopolitan). 
 
Treviño et al.'s (1998) results suggest that their measure of ethical culture is a better 
predictor of unethical behavior than the ethical climate construct. Thus, the role and 
influence of organizational ethical culture in public accounting firms, with its emphasis 
on phenomena such as systems of organizational rewards (punishment) for ethical 
(unethical) behavior and expectations of obedience to authority, is clearly worthy of 
examination. Indeed, we felt that a phenomenal measure of organizational ethical 
context might be a more useful predictor of tax practitioners' judgments, because in tax 
practice there is less emphasis on ideational constructs such as serving the public 
interest. 
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Prior research on the linkage between ethical context and decision making has focused 
primarily on the effects of the perceived context on the likelihood of unethical or 
dysfunctional behavior rather than ethical judgments. Based on their meta-analysis of 
research on ethical climate, Martin and Cullen (2006) conclude that certain dimensions 
of the perceived climate significantly affect the likelihood of unethical or dysfunctional 
behavior, organizational commitment, job satisfaction, and psychological well-being. 
However, their model did not include a linkage between ethical climate and morality 
judgments. Treviño et al. (1998) also emphasize the effects of ethical context on behavior, 
suggesting that the perceived ethical context essentially defines what is considered 
legitimate or acceptable within the organization. Their survey results provide support 
for this assertion, demonstrating that employees who perceived the ethical context in 
their organization to be more negative reported more observed incidences of unethical 
conduct. 
 
The effects of perceived ethical context on employees' ethical judgments appear to be 
more questionable. Because perceptions of ethical context define what is considered 
acceptable behavior within a particular work organization, it seems that such 
perceptions will be more likely to influence behavior than employees' perceptions of 
what is morally right or wrong. This contention is consistent with the empirical findings 
of the Shafer (2008) study, which concluded that certain dimensions of ethical climate 
had significant effects on auditors' self-reported behavioral intentions, but had little 
effect on ethical judgments. Accordingly, we propose the following hypothesis: 
 
H1. Organizational ethical cultures that are more supportive of professional 
ethics/values will reduce the likelihood that tax practitioners will engage in unethical 
behavior. 
 
 
Firm type 
 
Recent studies of public accountants in China have addressed the effects of firm type on 
both the perceived organizational ethical climate and ethical decisions. Shafer (2008) 
hypothesized that, relative to international firm auditors, auditors employed by local 
Chinese CPA firms would perceive the ethical climate in their organization to be more 
negative, judge questionable actions as more ethical, and estimate a higher probability of 
engaging in such actions. No significant effects of firm type on ethical climate 
perceptions were found, but local firm auditors did judge unethical actions more 
leniently and reported a higher likelihood of engaging in such actions. Also, Shafer (2009) 
found no differences in the ethical climates of local and international firms in mainland 
China. 
 
Shafer's (2008) hypotheses regarding differences between local and international firms 
in China were based primarily on recent concerns in the management and business 
ethics literature regarding the state of ethics and morality in that country (e.g. Lu and 
Enderle, 2006; Snell and Tseng, 2002; Hanafin, 2002; Koehn, 2001). Tam (2002) and 
Snell and Tseng (2002) suggest that the apparent decline in morality in China during the 
transition to a market economy is due to the absence of strong social, economic, and 
legal systems. Snell and Tseng (2002) further suggest that attempts to develop a 
supportive ethical culture in Chinese business enterprises are seriously impeded by 
perceptions of widespread corruption in the business community. This assertion is 
consistent with Victor and Cullen's (1988) argument that the ethical climate in 
organizations will reflect social norms. Based on their review of research on ethical 
climate, Martin and Cullen (2006) also conclude that the external organizational context 
(e.g. social norms or culture) is an important antecedent of the perceived ethical climate. 
Accounting researchers have also expressed doubts about the ability of Chinese firms to 
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maintain professional standards in light of the country's business environment (Cooper 
et al., 2002; Tang, 2000, 1999; Hao, 1999). 
 
However, the lack of support for differences in perceived ethical climates in the Shafer 
(2008, 2009) studies raises doubts regarding the legitimacy of these arguments, and also 
leaves us with little basis for hypothesizing a link between firm type and ethical 
decisions. Accordingly, while we were still interested in investigating tax practitioners in 
both local and international firms, we simply propose the following research question: 
 
RQ1. Will significant differences exist in the perceived ethical culture and ethical 
decisions of tax practitioners employed by local and international firms in China? 
 
 
Research method 
 
Instrument 
 
For purposes of the current study, participants were asked to respond to: 
 two brief tax cases; 
 a list of 15 items from the ethical culture questionnaire developed by Treviño 
et al. (1998) [3]; 
 an impression management scale (Paulhus, 1991); and 
 a demographic questionnaire[4]. 
 
The tax cases and ethical culture scale items are presented in the Appendix. 
 
The cases provided brief descriptions of ethical dilemmas commonly encountered in tax 
practice, and were initially developed in consultation with experienced tax practitioners 
working in CPA firms in Hong Kong and mainland China. Each case described an ethical 
dilemma, followed by a statement of the action taken by the hypothetical tax practitioner. 
Participants responded to each vignette by providing overall ethical judgments, 
judgments on six dimensions of the multidimensional ethics scale (MES)[5], the 
estimated likelihood that their professional peers would take the same action as the 
hypothetical CPA, and the estimated likelihood that they themselves would take the 
same action[6]. Responses were provided on seven-point scales, with seven indicating 
unethical actions and a higher estimated likelihood of committing similar actions. 
 
Responses to the ethical culture instrument were provided on a six-point scale anchored 
on “completely false” (1) and “completely true” (6). The impression management scale 
was used to control for potential social desirability response bias (Treviño et al., 1998; 
Randall and Fernandes, 1991; Paulhus, 1984). Responses were provided on a 
seven-point scale anchored on “not true” (1) and “very true” (7). Responses of six or 
seven to this scale (after reverse scoring) describe an extremely honest person, and are 
assumed to capture the propensity to exaggerate the truth or “manage” impressions of 
oneself. A single score for each participant is calculated as the total number of such 
responses (Paulhus, 1991). 
 
The instrument was translated from English to Chinese by a professional translator, and 
refined based on an independent back-translation. Following this procedure, the Chinese 
version of the instrument was pre-tested on a small sample of experienced tax 
practitioners in mainland China to identify any potential problems with understanding 
and to ensure that it addressed issues that were relevant in the context of their tax 
practice. These practitioners were interviewed to obtain their feedback on the 
instrument. Minor adjustments to the instrument to improve clarity were made based on 
the feedback obtained. 
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Due to the sensitive nature of research on ethics, steps were taken to encourage honest 
responses. For example, the questionnaire was accompanied by a cover letter from the 
researchers that assured participants that their responses would be treated as strictly 
confidential, the identity of the participating CPA firms would not be disclosed by the 
researchers, and the research results would only be analyzed and reported in the 
aggregate. In addition, participants were not asked to provide any personal identifying 
information in the instrument, giving them some assurance that their identity would not 
be known to the researchers. 
 
 
Participants 
 
The instrument was distributed through contacts at both local and international public 
accounting firms with offices in Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenzhen with the assistance of a 
professional research firm. Approximately 300 instruments were distributed to tax 
specialists at the senior, manager, and partner levels. An attempt was made to balance 
the sample between local and international firms. Participation in the survey was 
voluntary. Participants were instructed to complete the instrument without assistance, 
seal it in an accompanying envelope, and return it to the contact person for delivery to 
the researchers. 
 
A total of 144 usable responses were received, providing a response rate of slightly less 
than 50 percent. Although this response rate is relatively high for survey research of this 
type, the possibility of non-response bias should be acknowledged as a potential 
limitation of the study. We did not test for non-response bias due to a lack of 
demographic information on the pool of potential respondents. A summary of 
demographic information for participants is provided in Table I. The sample was 
approximately half male and half female, and included seniors (n=62), managers (n=60), 
and partners (n=21). The average age and professional experience of participants was 
33.8 and 8.9 years, respectively. A total of 54 percent of participants worked for local 
Chinese CPA firms, defined as firms with operations only within China, and 46 percent 
worked for international firms. Most participants held either a bachelors or a masters 
degree. The majority (55 percent) held CPA certifications, and approximately 14 percent 
held various specialty certifications, primarily in taxation. A relatively large number of 
participants (slightly less than 30 percent) failed to respond to the certification question; 
it seems reasonable to assume that these individuals were not professionally certified. 
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  % 
Gender a   
Male 68 48 
Female 74 52 
   
Age a 33.8  
Mean  8.7  
SD   
   
Professional experience (years) a   
Mean  8.9  
SD 7.1  
   
Position a   
Senior 62 43 
Manager 60 42 
Partner 21 15 
   
Firm type a   
PRC only 77 65 
International 65 46 
   
Degree held a   
Associate/none 12 8 
Bachelors 71 51 
Masters 43 31 
Other  14 10 
Professional certifications held   
CPA 80 55 
Other b 20 14 
Non or not reported c 44 31 
   
Note:  
a Numbers do not total 144 because of missing values;  
b These consist primarily of specialty tax certifications; 
c Most of the participants in this category failed to respond to the question.  It seems 
reasonable to assume that most of these respondents did not possess a professional 
certification   
 Table I. Summary of demographic data 
 
 
Findings 
 
Preliminary analyses 
 
Exploratory principal components factor analysis was used to test the dimensionality of 
the ethical culture scale. The results are reported in Table II. Using a cutoff value of 0.5, 
the 15 items loaded on three distinct factors with eigenvalues in excess of one, and there 
were no significant cross-loadings. As indicated in the Table, the first factor included ten 
items and explained 41 percent of the variance. Representative items from this factor 
include statements such as “ethical behavior is the norm in this organization”, “the top 
managers in this organization represent high ethical standards”, “people of integrity are 
rewarded in this organization”, and “unethical behavior is punished in this organization”. 
All the items included in this factor appear to relate to organizational ethical norms or 
incentives for ethical behavior; consequently, this factor will be referred to as “Ethical 
Norms/Incentives”. The internal reliability of these ten items, based on Cronbach's alpha, 
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was relatively high at 0.91. The second factor included three items designed by Treviño 
et al. (1998) to measure organizational expectations for obedience to authority, and 
accordingly will be referred to as such. This factor explained 16 percent of the variance 
and had an acceptable internal reliability of 0.73. The final factor included the two 
reverse-scored scale items, “employees in this organization perceive that people who 
violate the professional code of ethics still get formal organizational rewards”, and “top 
managers of this organization are models of unethical behavior”. In contrast to the first 
factor, which emphasizes ethical norms and incentives for ethical behavior, these two 
items associate organizational rewards or success with unethical behavior. Accordingly, 
this factor will be referred to as “Rewards for Unethical Behavior”. This factor explained 
seven percent of the variance and also had an acceptable reliability of 0.73[7] Scales 
were constructed by taking the mean of the items comprising each of the three ethical 
culture factors. 
 
Similar factor analyses were conducted for the multidimensional ethics scale items for 
each of the two cases. Consistent with the findings of Shafer (2008), the MES items 
loaded on two factors: one comprising three moral equity items (“just”, “fair”, and 
“morally right”) and one comprising one moral equity item (“acceptable to my family”) 
and two relativism items (“culturally acceptable” and “traditionally acceptable”). 
Separate moral equity and relativism scales were constructed for each of the two tax 
cases. The Cronbach alpha reliabilities for these four scales were all acceptable, ranging 
from 0.74 to 0.90. 
 
 Factor loadings a 
 1 2 3 
Management in this organization disciplines unethical 
behavior when it occurs 
0.642   
Penalties for unethical behavior are strictly enforced in 
this organization 
0.682   
Unethical behavior in punished in this organization 0.699   
The top managers of this organization represent high 
ethical standards 
0.589   
People of integrity are rewarded in this organization 0.825   
Top managers of this organization regularly show that 
they care about ethics 
0.781   
Ethical behavior is the norm in this organization 0.737   
Top managers of this organization guide decision making 
in an ethical direction 
0.716   
Ethical behavior is rewarded in this organization 0.861   
Professional ethics code requirements are consistent 
with informal organization norms 
0.719   
This organization demands obedience to authority 
figures without question 
0.771   
People in this organization are expected to do as they are 
told 
0.823   
The boss is always right in this organization 0.784   
Employees in this organization perceive that people who 
violate the professional code of ethics still get formal 
organizational rewards 
0.634   
Top managers of this organization are models of 
unethical behavior 
0.772   
Percentage of variance explained (%) 41 16 7 
Cronbach alpha 0.91 0.73 0.73 
Note:  
a Factor 1 = Ethical Norms / Incentives ; Factor 2 = Obedience to Authority ; Factor 3 = Rewards 
for Unethical Behavior  
 Table II. Ethical culture factor analysis 
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Analysis of mean responses 
 
Mean responses by firm type for the ethical judgment, behavioral intention, and ethical 
culture measures are summarized in Table III. As shown in the Table, the only significant 
difference in the perceived ethical culture between local and international firm 
employees was for the Rewards for Unethical Behavior factor. Local firm practitioners 
reported a lower degree of agreement that rewards/success were associated with 
unethical behavior in their organization. There were also no significant differences in the 
behavioral intentions of local and international firm employees, although international 
firm employees judged the actions as significantly more unethical for both cases, based 
on overall and moral equity judgments. Thus, consistent with Shafer (2008, 2009), our 
results indicate that local firm employees did not perceive the ethical context in their 
firms more negatively. Local firm employees judged unethical actions more leniently, but 
in contrast to the findings of Shafer (2008), local firm employees did not estimate a 
higher likelihood of committing questionable actions. 
 
ANOVA and regression analyses revealed that, with the exception of CPA firm type, 
demographic factors had little influence on the dependent measures. Accordingly, the 
other demographic measures were excluded from subsequent data analyses. 
 
The mean responses reported in Table III also indicate that the action described in Case 
1 was considered significantly more unethical than that in Case 2. Case 1 involved the 
creation of a fictitious intercompany expense provision to transfer profits to an 
associated company; thus, it involved a clearly fraudulent action. It is not surprising that 
participants considered this action to be unethical, as indicated by the mean rating of 
approximately six on a seven-point scale where seven represents “unethical”. 
Interestingly, there is a clear contrast between the overall/moral equity judgments and 
relativism judgments, with the action being rated less harshly on the relativism 
dimension. Thus, although participants as a group felt it was clearly unethical they were 
somewhat ambivalent regarding its cultural or social acceptability. The behavioral 
intention judgments also indicate significant probabilities of both peer and self-reported 
unethical behavior. The overall and moral equity judgments for Case 2 were only slightly 
above the midpoint of the scale and also had significantly higher standard deviations, 
suggesting the action in this case possessed lower moral intensity (Jones, 1991)[8]. The 
relativism judgments for Case 2 leaned toward the “acceptable” end of the scale, and the 
likelihoods of peer and self-reported behavior were relatively high, approaching five on 
the seven-point scale. This case involved setting up sales offices in low-tax jurisdictions 
in order to minimize the overall corporate tax liability, and perhaps not surprisingly 
participants' responses suggest that this type of action is more likely to be viewed as an 
acceptable tax planning strategy. 
 
 
  
10 
 
 
 Local firms Intl. firms Pooled 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Case 1       
Overall ethical judgments 5.74 2.12 6.42 1.04 6.05* 1.67 
Moral equity judgments 5.91 1.48 6.41 0.89 6.13* 1.24 
Relativism judgments 4.56 1.99 4.22 2.14 4.40 2.06 
Likelihood of peer behavior 4.09 2.58 4.09 2.45 4.09 2.53 
Likelihood of respondent behavior 3.32 2.55 3.14 2.39 3.24 2.46 
       
Case 2       
Overall ethical judgments 3.94 2.69 4.89 2.18 4.37* 2.52 
Moral equity judgments 4.01 2.27 4.96 1.84 4.44* 2.16 
Relativism judgments 3.07 2.09 3.23 1.89 3.14 2.04 
Likelihood of peer behavior 4.56 2.49 4.97 2.24 4.75 2.40 
Likelihood of respondent behavior 4.54 2.51 4.58 2.38 4.56 2.46 
       
Ethical culture       
Ethical Norms/Incentives 4.15 0.89 4.06 1.04 4.11 0.95 
Obedience to Authority 3.47 1.16 3.83 0.99 3.63 1.09 
Rewards for Unethical Behavior 4.43 1.23 3.88 1.47 4.18* 1.38 
       
Note:  
* Mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level; All ethical judgments were measures on sever-point 
scale where 7 represents unethical or unacceptable behavior; Behavioral intentions were measures 
on sever-point scale where 7 represents a higher likelihood of committing the behavior; the ethical 
culture measures were measured on six-points scales where 6 represents a more ethical culture  
 
Table III.  Mean responses 
 
 
 
Correlation and regression analyses 
 
Correlations among the continuous variables are reported in Table IV. Consistent with 
H1, for both cases the Ethical Norms/Incentives and Rewards for Unethical Behavior 
factors had highly significant negative correlations with the reported likelihoods of both 
peer behavior and self-reported behavior. These two factors also had significant positive 
correlations with relativism judgments, i.e. when the culture was perceived as more 
supportive of ethical values the actions were deemed to be less acceptable. As previously 
discussed, studies of the effects of ethical context generally have not hypothesized a link 
between context and ethical judgments; however, most of these studies did not measure 
relativism judgments. In hindsight, it seems logical to expect that perceptions of the 
ethical context in one's organization affect judgments of what is traditionally or 
culturally acceptable. The Obedience to Authority factor was significantly (p=0.05) and 
negatively correlated with overall ethical judgments for Case 1 (the correlation with 
moral equity judgments being marginally significant, p=0.07), but not for Case 2. Thus, 
for Case 1, a perceived organizational emphasis on strict obedience to authority led 
participants to judge aggressive actions as more ethical. This seems to imply that 
respondents may feel organizational pressure to commit unethical actions, i.e. 
organizational demands or expectations for engaging in questionable behavior may lead 
employees to rationalize such actions as being more ethically acceptable. 
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EJ1 ME1 RE1 LP1 LR1 EJ2 ME2 RE2 LP2 LR2 EN OA RU IM 
EJ1 – 
             
ME1 0.78  – 
            
 
0.00  
             
RE1 0.44  0.46  – 
           
 
0.00  
             
LP1 (0.07) (0.05) (0.40) – 
          
 
0.37  0.51  0.00  
           
LR1 (0.26) (0.22) (0.49) 0.71  – 
         
 
0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  
          
EJ2 0.37  0.29  0.12  (0.20) (0.13) – 
        
 
0.00  0.00  0.16  0.02  0.11  
         
ME2 0.26  0.25  0.12  (0.25) (0.11) 0.87  – 
       
 
0.00  0.00  0.15  0.00  0.18  0.00  
        
RE2 0.18  0.15  0.45  (0.48) (0.35) 0.59  0.67  – 
      
 
0.03  0.07  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
       
LP2 (0.10) (0.08) (0.37) 0.58  0.47  (0.41) (0.47) (0.66) – 
     
 
0.22  0.35  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
      
LR2 (0.16) (0.14) (0.30) 0.55  0.58  (0.49) (0.56) (0.68) 0.81  – 
    
 
0.06  0.10  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
      
EN (0.03) (0.12) 0.25  (0.41) (0.53) (0.02) (0.01) 0.32  (0.27) (0.32) – 
   
 
0.71  0.14  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.78  0.87  0.00  0.00  0.00  
    
OA (0.16) (0.15) (0.23) 0.06  0.12  (0.08) (0.08) (0.11) 0.02  0.08  (0.03) – 
  
 
0.05  0.07  0.01  0.50  0.15  0.32  0.33  0.21  0.78  0.31  0.73  
   
RU 0.01  0.05  0.35  (0.37) (0.35) (0.08) (0.04) 0.22  (0.31) (0.33) 0.51  (0.32) – 
 
 
0.87  0.57  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.32  0.65  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
  
IM 0.07  0.12  0.42  (0.37) (0.40) 0.02  0.07  0.36  (0.34) (0.36) 0.46  (0.08) 0.53  – 
 
0.40  0.14  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.82  0.42  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.32  0.00  
 
 
Note: The top number in each cell is the Pearson correlation coefficient, with negative correlations shown in 
parentheses; the bottom number is the significance level of the coefficient based on a two-tailed test; EJ1 = 
Overall ethical judgments for Case 1; ME1 = Moral equity judgments for Case 1; RE1 = Relativism judgments for 
Case 1; LP1 = Likelihood of peers engaging in similar behavior, Case 1; LR1 = Likelihood of respondent 
engaging in similar behavior, Case 1; EJ2 = Overall ethical judgments for Case 2; ME2 = Moral equity judgments 
for Case 2; RE2 = Relativism judgments for Case 2; LP2 = Likelihood of peers engaging in similar behavior, Case 
2; LR2 = Likelihood of respondent engaging in similar behavior, Case 2; EN = Ethical Norms/Incentives; RU = 
Rewards for Unethical Behavior; OA = Obedience to Authority; IM = Impression management 
 
Table IV.  Correlation Analysis 
 
 
The correlations also reveal that, with two exceptions, all ethical judgment measures 
were significantly and negatively correlated with both measures of behavioral intentions. 
This would be expected based on classic models of ethical decision making (e.g. Hunt 
and Vitell, 1991, 1986; Rest, 1986). Interestingly, overall and moral equity judgments for 
Case 1 were not significantly correlated with the estimated likelihood of peer behavior, 
although relativism judgments were highly correlated with such estimates. That is, 
participants felt the behavior of their peers would not be affected by whether the 
behavior was considered ethical or moral, but would be influenced by perceptions of 
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whether the behavior was deemed culturally or traditionally acceptable. Across both 
cases, relativism judgments also had the strongest correlations with both measures of 
behavioral intentions. Thus it appears that perceptions of what is culturally or 
traditionally acceptable or acceptable to one's family has a particularly strong influence 
on the behavioral intentions of Chinese tax practitioners. 
 
Somewhat surprisingly, the impression management variable was not significantly 
correlated with overall or moral equity judgments for either case. However, impression 
management exhibited highly significantly positive correlations with relativism 
judgments for both Case 1 (p=0.00) and Case 2 (p=0.00), implying that participants 
biased their reports of what is considered acceptable behavior in a socially desirable 
fashion (a higher propensity for impression management led to actions being judged as 
less acceptable). Impression management also had highly significant negative 
correlations with the behavioral intention measures for both cases, which implies that 
the estimated likelihood of both peer behavior and self-reported behavior is biased in a 
socially desirable fashion. Finally, impression management had highly significant 
positive correlations with two of the three ethical culture factors: Ethical 
Norms/Incentives (p=0.00) and Rewards for Unethical Behavior (p=0.00). These results 
imply that participants attempted to portray the culture in their firms in a relatively 
favorable light. 
 
Multiple regression models for ethical judgments and behavioral intentions are 
presented in Tables V and VI. Separate models are reported for overall, moral equity, and 
relativism judgments, and for the estimated likelihood of peer behavior and personal 
behavior. The models for Cases 1 and 2 are presented in Tables V and VI, respectively. 
The models for ethical judgments include the three ethical culture factors, CPA firm type, 
and impression management as independent variables[9]. 
 
Consistent with the correlation results reported in Table IV, among the three ethical 
culture variables only the Obedience to Authority factor had a significant effect (p=0.024) 
on overall ethical judgments for Case 1. Again, the relationship was negative, indicating 
that organizational cultures demanding higher degrees of obedience to authority led 
participants to judge aggressive tax avoidance more leniently. Consistent with the mean 
differences reported in Table III, the effect of firm type was also significant (p=0.001), 
with international firm members judging the actions to be more unethical. In the model 
for moral equity judgments, firm type (p=0.001) and impression management (p=0.033) 
were significant, and the Obedience to Authority factor was marginally significant 
(p=0.079). In the case of relativism judgments, only the Obedience to Authority (p=0.043) 
and impression management (p=0.000) variables were significant. 
 
Ethical judgments were included in the regression models for both likelihood of peer 
behavior and likelihood of respondent behavior, since judgments are widely assumed to 
be a precursor of intentions in models of ethical decision making[10]. Due to very high 
correlations between overall and moral equity judgments, moral equity judgments were 
excluded from the models in Tables V and VI[11]. The Ethical Norms/Incentives factor 
and relativism judgments had highly significant effects on the likelihood of peer behavior 
(p=0.007 and p=0.002 respectively) and on the likelihood of respondent behavior 
(p=0.000 and p=0.001 respectively). Firm type did not approach significance in either 
model, nor did any of the other variables. Both models were highly significant (p=0.000 
in both cases) and explained in excess of twenty percent of the variation in behavioral 
intentions. The significant effects of the Ethical Norms/Incentives factor on both 
measures of behavioral intentions provide partial support for H1. 
 
The results for Case 2, reported in Table VI, indicate that consistent with our 
expectations the ethical culture variables had little effect on overall or moral equity 
judgments. Firm type and impression management were also insignificant in these two 
models, and the models did not explain a significant amount of the variation in overall or 
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moral equity judgments. In the model for relativism judgments, the Ethical 
Norms/Incentives factor (p=0.015) and impression management (p=0.004) were both 
significant. In the model for the likelihood of peer behavior, the Rewards for Unethical 
Behavior factor was significant (p=0.005). The firm type variable again had no 
significant effects on behavioral intentions. Overall ethical judgments had only a 
marginally significant effect (p=0.088), but the effects of relativism judgments were 
highly significant (p=0.000). The model was also highly significant (p=0.000) and 
explained approximately half the variation in the estimated likelihood of peer behavior. 
The model for self-reported behavioral intentions indicates that again the Rewards for 
Unethical Behavior factor was significant (p=0.010), but the effects of firm type did not 
approach significance. Both overall (p=0.001) and relativism judgments (p=0.000) were 
highly significant, and the model explained over half the variation in behavioral 
intentions. Overall, the regression results for behavioral intentions provide partial 
support for H1. 
 
 
 
 
 
Standard 
beta 
t-statistic p-value 
Dependent variable = Overall ethical judgments    
Independent variables:    
Ethical Norms/Incentives  - 0.084 - 0.85 0.398 
Obedience to Authority - 0.200 - 2.29 0.024 
Rewards for unethical behavior - 0.045 - 0.41 0.684 
CPA firm type 0.272 3.29 0.001 
Impression Management 0.119 1.20 0.233 
F-value = 3.28; Model significance = 0.008;    
Adjusted R
2
 = 0.075    
Dependent variable = Moral equity judgments    
Independent variables:    
Ethical Norms/Incentives  - 0.071 - 0.73 0.529 
Obedience to Authority  - 0.154 - 1.77 0.079 
Rewards for unethical behavior 0.042 0.38 0.698 
CPA firm type  0.235 3.29 0.001 
Impression Management 0.213 2.15 0.033 
F-value = 3.89; Model significance = 0.003;    
Adjusted R
2 
 =  0.095    
Dependent variable = Relativism judgments    
Independent variables:    
Ethical Norms/Incentives  0.049 0.53 0.599 
Obedience to Authority  - 0.167 - 2.04 0.043 
Rewards for unethical behavior 0.087 0.85 0.398 
CPA firm type  - 0.027 - 0.35 0.730 
Impression Management 0.338 3.63 0.000 
F-value = 7.69; Model significance = 0.000;    
Adjusted R
2
 = 0.194    
Dependent variable = Likelihood of peer behavior    
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Independent variables:    
Ethical Norms/Incentives  - 0.250 - 2.76 0.007 
Obedience to Authority  - 0.064 - 0.78 0.435 
Rewards for unethical behavior  - 0.123 - 1.22 0.222 
CPA firm type 0.028 0.35 0.726 
Impression Management  - 0.067 - 0.71 0.481 
Overall ethical judgments 0.045 0.51 0.613 
Relativism judgments - 0.295 - 3.09 0.002 
F-value = 7.38; Model significance = 0.000;    
Adjusted R
2
 = 0.244    
Dependent variable = Likelihood of respondent behavior    
Independent variables:    
Ethical Norms/Incentives - 0.327 - 3.87 0.000 
Obedience to Authority 0.008 0.10 0.917 
Rewards for unethical behavior  - 0.036 - 0.38 0.701 
CPA firm type  - 0.020 - 0.27 0.783 
Impression Management  - 0.100 - 1.14 0.256 
Overall ethical judgments  - 0.113 - 1.36 0.177 
Relativism judgments  - 0.297 - 3.32 0.001 
F-value = 11.26; Model significance = 0.000;    
Adjusted R
2
 = 0.342    
    
Table V.  Regression for ethical decisions – Case 1 
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Standard 
beta 
t-statistic p-value 
Dependent variable = Overall ethical judgments    
Independent variables:    
Ethical Norms/Incentives  0.020 0.19 0.843 
Obedience to Authority - 0.143 - 1.57 0.117 
Rewards for unethical behavior - 0.199 - 1.75 0.083 
CPA firm type 0.096 1.12 0.265 
Impression Management 0.087 0.84 0.401 
F-value = 1.14; Model significance = 0.342;    
Adjusted R
2
 = 0.005    
Dependent variable = Moral equity judgments    
Independent variables:    
Ethical Norms/Incentives  - 0.041 - 0.14 0.891 
Obedience to Authority  - 0.123 - 1.35 0.178 
Rewards for unethical behavior - 0.150 - 1.32 0.191 
CPA firm type  0.111 1.29 0.199 
Impression Management 0.127 1.23 0.222 
F-value = 1.02; Model significance = 0.410;    
Adjusted R
2 
 =  0.001    
Dependent variable = Relativism judgments    
Independent variables:    
Ethical Norms/Incentives  0.238 2.47 0.015 
Obedience to Authority  - 0.099 - 1.16 0.246 
Rewards for unethical behavior - 0.102 - 0.96 0.338 
CPA firm type   0.040 0.50 0.621 
Impression Management 0.279 2.90 0.004 
F-value = 5.18; Model significance = 0.000;    
Adjusted R
2
 = 0.131    
Dependent variable = Likelihood of peer behavior    
Independent variables:    
Ethical Norms/Incentives  0.010 0.13 0.896 
Obedience to Authority  - 0.081 - 1.19 0.232 
Rewards for unethical behavior  - 0.239 - 2.86 0.005 
CPA firm type 0.060 0.71 0.443 
Impression Management  - 0.040 - 0.52 0.607 
Overall ethical judgments - 0.139 - 1.72 0.088 
Relativism judgments - 0.534 - 6.18 0.000 
F-value = 19.11; Model significance = 0.000;    
Adjusted R
2
 = 0.477    
Dependent variable = Likelihood of respondent behavior    
Independent variables:    
Ethical Norms/Incentives - 0.069 - 0.93 0.352 
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Obedience to Authority - 0.073 - 1.14 0.256 
Rewards for unethical behavior  - 0.209 - 2.62 0.010 
CPA firm type  0.064 0.86 0.394 
Impression Management  - 0.060 - 0.82 0.420 
Overall ethical judgments  - 0.253 - 3.27 0.001 
Relativism judgments  - 0.458 - 5.54 0.000 
F-value = 22.58; Model significance = 0.000;    
Adjusted R
2
 = 0.521    
    
Table VI.  Regression for ethical decisions – Case 2 
 
 
Discussion 
 
This study was an initial attempt to investigate the effects of organizational ethical 
culture on Chinese tax practitioners' decisions. The results for a relatively high moral 
intensity case indicate that the Ethical Norms/Incentives factor had a highly significant 
effect on both measures of behavioral intentions. This suggests that an organizational 
culture that emphasizes and rewards ethical behavior, and in which organizational 
leaders serve as positive role models, reduces the likelihood that tax practitioners will 
engage in overly aggressive actions. In a relatively low moral intensity case, the Rewards 
for Unethical Behavior factor had a significant effect on behavioral intentions, but the 
Ethical Norms/Incentives factor was not significant. Thus, for ethical issues of relatively 
low moral intensity, utilitarian considerations such as rewards to be gained from the 
behavior appear highly salient to Chinese tax practitioners' decision processes. 
 
These findings clearly imply that top managers in public accounting firms should make 
an effort to develop and maintain positive or supportive cultures in their organizations. 
Researchers in management and business ethics often acknowledge the importance of 
the “tone at the top” set by organizational leaders, and suggest that attempts to maintain 
a positive ethical culture will not be effective unless management backs up their 
rhetorical claims regarding the importance of ethics with their actions (e.g. Treviño et al., 
1999; Grojean et al., 2004). Grojean et al. (2004) argue that, to create a supportive 
ethical culture, top management should serve as positive role models for ethical behavior, 
establish and communicate clear expectations for ethical behavior throughout the 
organization, and formally recognize and reward behavior that is consistent with 
organizational values. Such strategies are clearly reflected in our Ethical 
Norms/Incentives factor; thus, the significant impact of this factor on behavioral 
intentions in the high moral intensity case provides empirical support for their practical 
significance. Schminke et al. (2007) argue that top managers should adopt a proactive 
approach to managing organizational ethical culture that involves assessing the existing 
culture and providing training to address identified problems or deficiencies. Our 
findings imply that such management strategies may improve the quality of ethical 
decision making by Chinese tax advisors. 
 
In line with our expectations, the ethical culture factors generally had little impact on 
morality judgments. The primary exception was the Obedience to Authority factor, which 
had at least a marginally significant effect on all ethical judgment measures for the high 
intensity case. A stronger organizational emphasis on Obedience to Authority was 
associated with more lenient ethical judgments. One possible explanation for this finding 
is that demands for obedience to authority lead public accountants to rationalize 
questionable behaviors as ethically acceptable. Expectations of obedience to authority in 
Chinese public accounting firms and the effects of such expectations on ethical decision 
making should be further explored to clarify this issue. 
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Tax practitioners employed by local CPA firms assessed questionable actions more 
leniently based on overall and moral equity judgments, but these judgments had limited 
effects on behavioral intentions. Local firm employees also did not estimate a higher 
likelihood of committing questionable actions. Thus, the current study provides little 
support for the proposition that local Chinese public accountants will behave less 
ethically than their international firm counterparts. Further, consistent with the findings 
of Shafer (2008, 2009), local firm employees did not assess the ethical context in their 
firms more negatively. The collective results of these studies seem to provide a 
reasonable basis for concluding that firm type is not a significant antecedent of the 
perceived ethical context in public accounting firms in mainland China. Martin and 
Cullen (2006) suggest there are three types of antecedents of ethical context: external 
factors (e.g. national culture or broad social norms), organizational form (e.g. 
corporations v. professional partnerships) and strategic and managerial orientations. 
The lack of significant effects for firm type (which was assumed to reflect differential 
effects of external social norms) on perceptions of ethical context among Chinese public 
accountants implies that firm type may be too broad a measure to produce meaningful 
results. Thus, researchers may wish to examine the effects of more specific factors on the 
ethical context in accounting firms, such as top management characteristics. 
 
A significant finding of the current study is that, across both cases, relativism judgments 
emerged as the strongest influence on behavioral intentions. In the regression models 
for the high intensity case, neither overall nor moral equity judgments had a significant 
effect on intentions, but the effects of relativism were highly significant. Overall and 
moral equity judgments had significant or marginally significant effects on behavioral 
intentions in the low intensity case, but again relativism judgments were the variable 
with the strongest influence. These results, particularly in the high intensity case, 
diverge from those of Henderson and Kaplan (2005). In that study, moral equity, 
relativism, and contractualism judgments all had significant effects on evasion intentions 
among a sample of taxpayers. One could argue that relativism should be particularly 
salient to our participants, since it is often suggested that culture and tradition have a 
strong impact on the views of Chinese. For instance, Vitell et al. (1993) proposed that 
ethical decisions in collectivist cultures such as China are more likely to be influenced by 
informal norms regarding what is considered ethically acceptable or appropriate 
behavior[12]. 
 
Another interesting finding relating to relativism judgments is that they were strongly 
associated with the propensity for impression management, while overall and moral 
equity judgments were not[13]. Our participants were particularly sensitive to questions 
regarding what is traditionally or culturally acceptable, or acceptable to one's family. The 
fact that relativism judgments were closely guarded implies at least a suspicion on the 
part of participants that what is viewed as acceptable behavior in Chinese tax practice 
would likely be considered unethical by outside observers. In light of the previously 
discussed claims regarding the poor state of business ethics in China, this finding raises 
concerns regarding the ethical behavior of Chinese tax advisors, suggesting they may be 
negatively influenced by the general acceptance of aggressive behavior in their cultural 
environment. Cross-cultural studies of tax practitioners' ethical decisions in Chinese and 
Western contexts may provide further insight on these issues. 
 
Our findings regarding relativism judgments also extend the work of Shafer (2008). That 
study reported that overall ethical judgments significantly impacted Chinese auditors' 
self-reported behavioral intentions, but neither distinguished between high and low 
moral intensity cases nor tested the effects of relativism judgments on intentions. Our 
use of high and low moral intensity cases and simultaneous examination of the effects of 
both overall and relativism judgments reveals a quite different picture regarding the 
relationships among judgments and intentions. As discussed above, the effects of overall 
ethical judgments on intentions did not approach significance in our high moral intensity 
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case, but across both cases and both measures of behavioral intentions, relativism 
judgments had highly significant effects on intentions. Our findings regarding the effects 
of impression management on relativism judgments also provide a stark contrast with 
the results of Shafer's (2008) study of Chinese auditors – in that study the effects of 
impression management on relativism judgments did not approach significance. 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
In certain respects, our findings support recent research on ethical context in Chinese 
accounting firms. But they also extend that work and reveal some interesting contrasts. 
Consistent with Shafer's (2008) study of auditors, a basic conclusion that may be drawn 
from the current study is that the ethical context in public accounting firms has the 
potential to significantly impact professional employees' behavioral intentions. 
Consistency of such basic findings across distinct functional specializations such as 
auditing and taxation significantly enhances their generalizability. 
 
The current study is the first to use the Treviño et al. (1998) measure of ethical culture 
in a public accounting context. The significant effects of the Ethical Norms/Incentives 
factor on behavioral intentions in the high intensity case indicates that if firm 
management establishes norms and expectations for ethical behavior and such behavior 
leads to formal organizational rewards, the likelihood of overly aggressive actions may 
be decreased. This finding has important practical implications for CPA firms: if they 
wish to promote high standards of ethical behavior they should take proactive steps to 
foster a supportive organizational ethical culture. 
 
The Obedience to Authority and Rewards for Unethical Behavior factors are unique to 
the Treviño et al. (1998) instrument, and provide some interesting findings. The fact that 
perceived demands for Obedience to Authority impacted morality judgments in the high 
intensity case is a novel finding, contrasting with Shafer's (2008) general conclusion that 
ethical context does not affect morality judgments and suggesting that organizational 
pressure to engage in questionable actions may lead professional employees to 
rationalize their moral acceptability. 
 
The significant impact of Rewards for Unethical Behavior on ethical judgments in the 
low intensity case is also a novel finding in the context of tax practice, indicating that 
utilitarian considerations hold sway when ethical issues are in the “gray area”. This 
finding may portend problems with Chinese tax practitioners' ethical decisions: if 
participants readily admit that purely utilitarian factors such as monetary rewards 
influence their willingness to engage in unethical behavior, it seems likely that such 
individuals may continue down a “slippery slope” of increasingly aggressive behavior if it 
is encouraged and rewarded. 
 
Another unique finding of the current study is the emergence of relativism as the 
dominant influence on behavioral intentions. Chinese tax practitioners appear unwilling 
to frankly report what is considered acceptable in their local environment, yet 
considerations of what is acceptable have the greatest influence on their behavioral 
intentions in ethically charged situations. Taken together, these findings imply that 
cultural acceptability of aggressive tax avoidance in mainland China increases the 
likelihood that tax advisors will condone or acquiesce in such behavior. Obviously, this 
issue should be further investigated so that more firm conclusions may be reached. 
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Notes 
1. Treviño et al. (1998) tested the effects of both ethical climate (Victor and Cullen, 
1988, 1987) and ethical culture (Treviño, 1990) on observed unethical behavior and 
organizational commitment. They refer to these two constructs collectively as 
“ethical context”, and we use this term in a similar fashion in the current paper. 
2. For a recent review and meta-analysis of studies of organizational ethical climate, 
see Martin and Cullen (2006). For an exemplary study of the effects of both ethical 
climate and ethical culture on observed instances of unethical behavior in 
organizations and organizational commitment, see Treviño et al. (1998). 
3. The Treviño et al. (1998) scale included several items designed to measure the 
presence of formal corporate codes of conduct. Because CPA firms are all required to 
follow a professional code of conduct, these items seemed less relevant in this 
context and were omitted. 
4. Participants completed additional instruments used in related studies. 
5. Henderson and Kaplan (2005) and Shafer (2008) both used eight items from the 
multidimensional ethics scale. However, in his study of Chinese auditors, Shafer 
(2008) found that two items relating to contractualism did not load significantly on 
any factor. Thus, these items were excluded from the current study. The six MES 
items included in the current study were “just”, “fair”, “morally right”, “acceptable to 
my family”, “culturally acceptable” and “traditionally acceptable”. 
6. Prior studies of accounting ethics have sometimes assumed that estimates of the 
likelihood of peer behavior represent a closer approximation of participants' own 
behavioral intentions than do self-reports. We felt that inclusion of both measures 
was desirable to provide contrasts between the two. 
7. The factor analysis results for these 15 items are similar to the results obtained by 
Treviño et al. (1998) based on their sample of US college graduates. The primary 
difference is that the Rewards for Unethical Behavior items loaded on a separate 
dimension in our study, but loaded on a single dimension that included these items 
and most of the Ethical Norms/Incentives items in the Treviño et al. (1998) study. 
8. One of the determinants of moral intensity in Jones' (1991) influential model is the 
degree of social consensus that an action is unethical. A higher degree of consensus 
that an action is unethical suggests a higher degree of moral intensity. Thus, the fact 
that participants rated the action in Case 1 as clearly more unethical, combined with 
the relatively low standard deviations for overall and moral equity judgments, 
indicate a higher degree of moral intensity or moral imperative associated with this 
case. 
9. Although significant correlations existed among some of the independent variables 
included in the models reported in Tables V and VI, none of the variance inflation 
factors for any of these models exceeded 1.9, which indicates that the results were 
not significantly biased by multicollinearity. 
10. The inclusion of the ethical judgment variables in these models had no impact on the 
effects of the ethical culture variables – when the models are run excluding 
judgments, the Ethical Norms/Incentives factor is highly significant and neither of 
the other culture variables approaches significance, as subsequently discussed. 
11. When both overall and moral equity judgments were included in the models, the 
variance inflation factors for these two variables were each approximately three, 
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indicating a significant multicollinearity problem. When moral equity judgments are 
substituted for overall ethical judgments, the effects of moral equity judgments are 
very similar to those for overall equity judgments, and the effects of relativism 
judgments remain highly significant. 
12. An often-discussed example of such informal norms is the practice of guanxi, or the 
cultivation of relationships through reciprocal favors such as gift-giving. Although 
guanxi is often viewed as unethical in Western cultures, its long-standing cultural 
acceptance in Chinese society contributes to its perpetuation (Su et al., 2003; Su and 
Littlefield, 2001; Hwang, 1987). 
13. Recall that impression management was not significantly correlated with overall or 
moral equity judgments for either case, but was highly correlated with relativism 
judgments. Also, with one exception (moral equity judgments for Case 1), impression 
management did not affect overall or moral equity judgments in the regression 
models, but was the strongest influence on relativism judgments. 
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Appendix. Tax cases and ethical culture scale 
 
Case 1 
Mr Chan has been the tax preparer of Company A, based in Shanghai, for several 
years. Company A has made unexpectedly high profits in the last month of the year. Mr 
Chan is asked by the company to create an expense provision representing service fees 
for services rendered in Hong Kong by an associated company incorporated in Hong 
Kong. This is done to reduce the taxable profits of A by moving those profits to the 
associated company. The associated company has made substantial losses this year in 
Hong Kong, and so can set off the transferred profits against its losses. However, Mr 
Chan is aware that, in fact, there have been no services provided by the associated 
company. 
Action: Mr Chan prepares Company A's tax return with the inclusion of the provision for 
service fees expense. 
 
Case 2 
Company B has a factory in Guangzhou. It sells its products to customers both in the PRC 
and overseas. Its tax rate is 33 percent. Mr Zhu, a tax practitioner, suggests Company B 
establish a sales office in Shenzhen (where the tax rate is 15 percent), and a company in 
Hong Kong (where the tax rate is 17.5 percent). All goods for the domestic market are 
then transferred to the Shenzhen sales office, and all goods for export sales are 
transferred to the Hong Kong company, in both cases at a very low margin. This shifts 
the profit from Guangzhou to lower-tax Shenzhen and Hong Kong, thus reducing the 
overall tax payable. 
Action: Mr Zhu prepares Company B's PRC income tax return, reporting only very low 
profits in Guangzhou. 
 
Ethical culture scale 
1. Management in this organization disciplines unethical behavior when it occurs. 
2. Employees in this organization perceive that people who violate the professional 
code of ethics still get formal organizational rewards.* 
3. Penalties for unethical behavior are strictly enforced in this organization. 
4. Unethical behavior is punished in this organization. 
5. The top managers of this organization represent high ethical standards. 
6. People of integrity are rewarded in this organization. 
7. Top managers of this organization regularly show that they care about ethics. 
8. Top managers of this organization are models of unethical behavior.* 
9. Ethical behavior is the norm in this organization. 
10. Top managers of this organization guide decision making in an ethical direction. 
11. Ethical behavior is rewarded in this organization. 
12. Professional ethics code requirements are consistent with informal 
organizational norms. 
13. This organization demands obedience to authority figures, without question. 
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14. People in this organization are expected to do as they're told. 
15. The boss is always right in this organization. 
 
Note: *Reverse scored 
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